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Fallacies do not cease to be fallacies because they become fashions.
-G. K. Chesterton
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1. Summary
The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie - deliberate,
contrived and dishonest - but the myth - persistent, persuasive and
unrealistic.
-John F. Kennedy
California has a complex, highly interconnected, and decentralized
water system. Although local operations draw on considerable expertise
and analysis, broad public policy and planning discussions about water
often involve a variety of misperceptions - or myths - about how the system
works and the options available for improving its performance. The
prevalence of myth and folklore makes for lively rhetoric, but hinders the
development of effective policy, raising environmental and economic costs
and sometimes placing lives at risk. Moving beyond myth toward more
factual, scientifically based water policy is essential if California is to meet
the multiple, sometimes competing, goals for sustainable management in
the twenty-first century: supplying agricultural, environmental, and urban
demands for water supply and quality and ensuring adequate protection
from floods.
We focus on twelve common water myths, involving water supply,
ecosystems, flood management, and the legal and political aspects of
governing California's water system. These are not the only California water
myths - and they are not all unique to California - but they are ones we find
to be particularly distracting and disruptive to public policy discussions. For
each myth, we provide a brief assessment of how the myth misleads, and we
point to a more accurate characterization of the issue that would provide a
better foundation for policymaking.
In combating these myths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational
and informed approach to water policy and management in the state. Most
water myths have their origins in at least a kernel of truth. But that kernel of
truth has become distorted through exaggeration, oversimplification, or
uncritical acceptance. Often, myths serve the rhetorical purposes of
particular interest groups. But myths are able to persist because our public
policy debates are not sufficiently grounded in solid technical and scientific
information about how we use and manage water.
With the information presented here we seek to begin rebuilding
public policy discussions on more myth-free foundations. Improving the
collection, analysis, synthesis, dissemination, and discussion of accurate
information about the state's water system is also necessary to encourage
fact-based policies. of course, information alone will not dispel California's
water myths, but it can fashion more effective responses to California's
many ongoing and future water challenges.
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The Myth The Reality
Water Supply Myths
California has run out of abundant
California is running out of water. water and will need to adapt to
increasing water scarcity.
There is no true villain in California
lInsert villain here] is responsible water policy, but opportunities exist
for California's water problems. for all sectors to better use and
manage water.
New infrastructure can contribute to
We can build our way out of California's water supply solutions,
California's water problems. but it is not a cure-all in either
economic or environmental terms.
We can conserve our way out of Water conservation is important, but
California's water problems. its effectiveness is often overstated.
Water markets provide important
Water markets can solve incentives for cooperation and




significant value to the California
Healthy aquatic ecosystems economy. Although some tradeoffs
conflict with a healthy economy. exist among water uses, there are
many opportunities for mutually
beneficial water management.
More water will lead to healthy Fish need more than water to thrive.
fish populations
California's ecosystems are
Restoring native ecosystems is irreversibly altered and constantly
essential for native species changing. We must find ways to
recovery, restore native species within such
altered ecosystems.
Flood Management Myth
HeinOnline  -- 16 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envt'l L. & Pol'y 8 2010
West & Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010
Current flood protection Current standards increase flood risk
standards keep communities safe in many locations.
Governance and Legal Myths
The legal tools for reform are already
California's water rights laws present in California's water rights
impede reform and sustainable laws. We just need to start using
management. them.
Despite some legal distinctions,
Groundwater is separate from California groundwater and surface
surface water. water are often closely interconnected
and managed jointly.
Tough tradeoffs mean that consensus
We can find a consensus that will is not achievable on all water issues;
keep all parties happy. higher levels of government will need
to assert leadership.
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Il. Introduction
The difficulty ain't that we know so much, but that we know so much
that ain't so.
-Josh Billings, as quoted by Mark Twain
California is again in the throes of intense public policy debates about
how to manage water. Several years of dry weather have depleted reservoirs
and groundwater basins. New environmental restrictions on shipping water
through the fragile Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta have intensified water
supply concerns in cities and farming regions that rely on these shipments,
and proposals to bypass the Delta with a peripheral canal have Delta residents
and others worried about consequences for their regions and interests.
These may be the most visible and vocal issues of the moment, but a
virtual tour around the state reveals significant water management concerns
at every turn. To the west, cities and farms in the Russian River watershed
have been ordered to reduce their water use to restore flows for steelhead
trout. To the south, some Imperial Valley residents are still smarting over
requirements to fallow some irrigated acreage as part of a long-term transfer
of Colorado River water to San Diego. To the east, the success of a hard-
fought deal to restore salmon on the San loaquin River depends on
continued cooperation among fractious stakeholder groups and
improvements in conditions downstream. To the north, water allocations
for salmon remain a recurring source of conflict on the Klamath River. And
across the state, flood-prone communities have petitioned the federal
government for reprieves from stricter floodplain designations, so property
can be developed and residents can avoid costly flood insurance.
Some summary statistics highlight why the environmental conditions
of California's water resources have become a major management concern
in recent decades: Twenty-two percent of the state's 122 remaining native
fish species are already listed as threatened or endangered under the state
and federal Endangered Species Acts, and another forty-five percent are
imperiled or qualified for listing.' More than ninety percent of California's
lakes, rivers and streams are listed as "impaired," meaning they cannot be
used for one or more of their intended uses (e.g., drinking, irrigation, fishing,
swimming) (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).
Looking ahead, the challenges and conflicts of water management are
likely to intensify, as population growth and climate change increase
pressure on California's resources. The state is projected to gain roughly
half a million residents per year over the coming decades (Department of
I. Moyle, Ouinones Katz (Forthcoming). Nine of the state's 131 native fish
species have become extinct since California became a state.
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Finance, 2007), and warming temperatures and accelerating sea level rise
will make it increasingly difficult to satisfy agricultural, urban, and
environmental water demands and to ensure adequate protection from
floods (Cayan, et al., 2009).
Policy decisions will be most effective in addressing water management
goals if they are based on an accurate understanding of the state's water
problems and potential solutions. Unfortunately, California currently
possesses little systematic technical knowledge and coordinated research
capability to support and advance policy discussions and decisions. In part,
this information deficit stems from the highly decentralized nature of water
management. More than a thousand local and regional water agencies are
responsible for water delivery, wastewater treatment, and flood control,
alongside many state and federal agencies. Decentralized management has
facilitated responsiveness to local problems, but it also has fragmented much
of the detailed knowledge and strategic perspectives on California's vast water
system. The state, for its part, with few resources and many competing
pressures, requires little reporting of information from the field and devotes
few resources to technical decision support and synthesis, monitoring of
water use, and enforcement of water rights.
As a result, misperceptions - or myths - about California's water
problems and solutions abound among the public, policymakers, and even
many water professionals. These myths - often used to support particular
stakeholder interests confuse public policy discussions, legislative
debates, and water management decisions, making them less productive
and useful than they need to be for California's water system to respond
effectively to its mounting challenges.
This paper explores twelve prominent myths about California water
supply, ecosystem management, flood control, and the legal and policy
process for water governance. We bring together perspectives from ecology,
economics, engineering, law, and the physical sciences to examine the
origins of these myths, how they influence policy, and where they fall short
in their assessment of water problems and solutions. For each myth, we
then suggest a replacement that would better guide policy. A concluding
section summarizes key elements of a myth-free policy platform for
California and highlights actions to strengthen the information and analysis
needed for sound policy decisions.
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II!. Water Supply Myths
Myth: California is Running Out of Water




The popular press often propagates the myth that California is running
out of water. As a recent example: "Have you seen Lake Oroville lately? If
so, you know California is running out of water" (Speer, 2008). The myth
stems from a rigid notion that there is no flexibility in water management
and that the economy will grind to a halt if shortages occur. The myth
persists despite ample historical evidence and numerous economic and
technical studies shoving that Californians can adapt successfully (albeit at
some cost and inconvenience) to living in an arid region with variable and
changing water conditions. By implying that Californians cannot adapt, the
"running out of water myth" discourages efforts to manage and use water
resources more efficiently.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The notion that "California is running out of water" is. commonly
employed to raise alarm about serious water problems, but it encourages a
simplistic and sometimes counter-productive attitude towards solving them.
If we are "running out of water," then we have to "get more." The underlying
assumption of this myth is that California's water use and management are
more or less fixed. So new water demands from population growth can only
be addressed by developing additional supplies, at any cost. In this view,
California's water users have little ability to better use and stretch existing
supplies through improvements in operations, gains.in water use efficiency,
or reallocation among users.
The Reality
This myth has a kernel of truth, in the sense that California's available
water supplies are limited. Most of California's river flows have already been
allocated (sometimes several times over), and groundwater resources have
been overdrawn in many areas.' The myth persists because water users
2. lsenberg, et al., (2008b) report estimates from the State Water Resources
Control Board that allocations of surface water in the Sacramento and San Joaquin
river watersheds amount to roughly eight times the average streamflow, and three
times the highest streamflow on record.
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often experience shortages, relative to water contracts and rights amounts
and past use, due to drought and environmental restrictions. With climate
change, shortages could increase as warming temperatures reduce supplies
currently stored in the Sierra Nevada snowpack (Cayan, et al., 2009).
However, water scarcity does not mean that we are "running out of
water." Given California's Mediterranean-type climate, with variable rainfall
and a dry growing season, water has always been scarce, and adaptation has
always been an important feature of water use. Even in the state's earliest
days, appropriative water rights evolved to allow gold miners to move water
to new locations when the original mines were played out. Changes in the
economic value of water were the original drivers for shifting water between
sectors, with water moving from gold mining to farming in the early part of
the twentieth century, and more recently from farming to urban uses.
California water allocations also have shifted (though not without fierce
debates) in response to changing social values, particularly as the rise of
environmental concerns has led to reallocations of more flows to aquatic
habitat.
Figure 1 highlights the long-term shifts in California's economy,
progressing from mining, to agriculture and manufacturing, to services,
which now account for roughly three-quarters of all jobs. Figure 2 shows
more recent water use trends for the agricultural and urban (non-farm
business and residential) sector. Agriculture and related activities now
account.for about five percent of California employment, and a large, but
declining share of non-environmental water use - seventy-seven percent in
2005, down from ninety percent in 1960. Consistent long-term data on
dedicated environmental flows are not available, but there is consensus that
environmental uses of water have increased during this time with the rise of
environmental concerns and regulations. Statewide water availability for all
purposes has diminished somewhat during this period due to reductions in
water available from the Colorado River and groundwater overdraft in some
areas.
In response to scarcity, Californians have made considerable gains in
water use efficiency. A driving force for improving the economic efficiency of
irrigation is the steady increase in crop yields per acre. Over the last four
decades, California's crop yields have increased at an average rate of 1.42%
per year (Brunke, Howitt, and Sumner, 2005). As farmers have shifted to
higher value horticultural and orchard crops, they have adopted more
efficient irrigation technologies.3 Thanks to yield increases and a shift to
3. Orang, Matyac, and Snyder (2008) report surface irrigation use decreased
by about thirty percent from 1972 to 2001 and drip/microsystem use increase by
about thirty-one percent, mostly from reduced field crop and increased orchard and
vineyard planting. Most of the switch occurred from the early 1990s onward. Using
Department of Water Resources data on applied water use and irrigated acreage, we
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higher value crops, the real dollar value per acre-foot of irrigation water has
increased considerably.'
FIGURE 1:















20% oteOO G o8o o
Source. Author calculations using Census data (IPUMS, 1950 industry basis).
Note. Agriculture includes farmralated wholesale trade and manufacturing as well as
forestry (which never exceeded 0. 2 0 of employment and now accounts for less than 0l:1%
"Other Goods" includes non-food manufacturing and construction. Recreation includes
fisheries (which never exceeded 0.5%o of employment and now accounts for less than O.lol
Urban dwellers also have been adapting. Following several decades of
estimate water applied per acre has declined from an average of 3.5 acre-feet per acrein the 1960s-1980s to 3.2 acre-feet per acre from 1990 to 2005 .
4 From 1972 to 1995. the real value of output per acre-foot of applied
irrigation water increased by 19.3 percent when using the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) deflator to measure inflation, and by 92.6 percent when deflated using US
Department of AgricUlture index of prices received by farmers Brunke. et al., 2005).
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increases in per capita use spurred by rising incomes and increased home
and lot sizes, many urban water agencies began implementing conservation
programs during the early 1990s drought. These have reduced per capita
use in both coastal and inland regions of California (Figure 3). (Inland
California is shown with and without the low-desert Colorado River region,
where per capita use is particularly high). Further use reductions are
occurring from the recent drought and new environmental restrictions on
pumping water to users south and west of the Delta.
FIGURE 2:
Trends in Agricultural and Urban Water Use, 1960 - 2005 (millions of
acre-feet)










I I I I I I I I
1960 1967 1972 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Author calculations using data from California Water Plan Updates (Department
of Water Resources, various years).
Note: Data for 2005 are provisional. Figure shows applied water use (for a definition,
see the "conserve our way out" myth). "Urban" includes residential and non-agricultural
business uses. Pre-2000 estimates are adjusted to levels that would have been used in a year of
normal rainfall- Estimates for 2000 and 2005 are for actual use; both years had near-normal
precipitation. Estimates omit conveyance losses, which is six percent to nine percent of the
total.
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Water managers also have improved the management of developed
water supplies, which has enhanced water supply reliability and flexibility.
Tools include banking excess surface water from wet years in groundwater
basins for use in dry years ("conjunctive use"), treating wastewater and
stormwater for reuse, and the marketing and trading of water, all of which
have expanded greatly since the 1990s.'
FIGURE 3:




CL InlIa n d
"o 300








1960 1967 1972 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Author calculations using Department of Water Resources (DWR) data (2005
numbers are provisional)
Note: Figure shows applied water use (for a definition, see the "conserve our way out"
myth). Outdoor water use is much higher in inland areas because of hotter temperatures and
larger lot sizes (Hanak and Davis, 2006). The low-desert Colorado River region, including areas
such as Palm Springs, has especially high per capita use from golf-based tourism.
Various studies suggest considerable scope for future adaptations to
scarcity, including further gains in water use efficiency, changing operating
5. Department of Water Resources, 2003, 2005a; http:/www.semitropic.com/;
www.kwb.org.
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schedules for water stored and released from reservoirs (reservoir
"reoperation"), improvements in conjunctive use and recycling, and some
additional reallocation across sectors through water marketing (Department
of Water Resources, 2009a; Jenkins, et al., 2003; Tanaka, et al., 2006;
Zilberman, et al., 1993). Although climate change may significantly reduce
water availability and growth in farm revenues, California agriculture
appears able to adapt without declines in revenues from today's levels,
thanks to projected improvements in irrigation and crop production
technology and demand growth for higher value crops.'
Considerable potential remains for continued adaptation to water
scarcity. California agriculture still applies more water per acre to irrigate
crops than countries with similar climates and export-oriented agricultural
sectors.7 Likewise, per capita urban use in California remains quite high
among developed economies with similar climates.' In many of these
countries, water users have moved more aggressively to adopt more efficient
irrigation technology, modify cropping patterns, limit outdoor landscaping
use in the residential sector, recharge groundwater basins, capture
stormwater, and increase use of recycled wastewater.
In short, this myth is true only if California's water sector does not
muster the incentives, technology, and political capacity to adapt to
changing demands and preferences for water use as it has in the past.
Replacing the Myth
California is not running out of water, but the state will face increasing
water scarcity. It is often said, "There is not a shortage of water, only a
6. To assess the scope for adaptation, we simulated conditions in 2050
using the Statewide Agricultural Production Model ("SWAP") as presented in Howitt,
et al. (2009a). The simulation 'ssumes a warm-dry scenario of climate change
(twenty-eight percent decline in water supply from all sources), assuming a modest
increase in crop productivity relative to past trends (an average twenty-nine percent
cumulative increase for all crops, following Brunke, et al., 2005 and Howitt, et al.,
2009a) and continued demand growth for high value fruits and nuts. Irrigated
acreage falls twenty percent statewide but statewide revenues from agriculture
increase by twenty-five percent relative to 2005 levels. The decline in water use does
lower the growth in revenues by about two-thirds relative to conditions without
climate change.
7. California's average since 1990 has been around 3.2 acre-feet per acre.
Recent application rates (in acre-feet per acre) are estimated at 2.48 in Australia, 2.11
in Spain, 1.70 in Italy, and 1.65 in Israel (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, n.d.). In contrast, other western states that rely heavily on irrigation
have application rates similar to or higher than California's (Hutson, et al., 2004).
Crop consumptive use of water is often directly linked to crop yield.
8. Urban per capita use (in gallons per person per day) in the early 2000s is
estimated at 130 in Australia, 100 in Italy, 84 in Spain, and 76 in Israel (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, n.d.), versus roughly 210 in
California.
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shortage of cheap water."
Institutions and technologies must continue to adapt and change to
meet future demands. Public education can help Californians realize that
they reside in an arid region. With continued attention and adaptation,
California can have sufficient water resources to sustain prosperous social
and economic development into the indefinite future.
Myth: [insert Villain Here] Is Responsible for California's
Water Problems.
As for an authentic villain, the real thing, the absolute, the artist, one
rarely meets him or her even once in a lifetime. The ordinary bad hat
is always in part a decent fellow.
-Colette
The Myth
California's water system would work well if it were not for [fill in the
blank].
One of the most common myths about California water is that some
Villain is preventing the state from meeting its water demands. Eliminating
or reforming that villain would solve California's water problems. Call it the
"Chinatown Myth" in honor of the evil Noah Cross who was stealing the
water from beneath people's noses, creating artificial shortages. A good
villain is always rhetorically useful and makes problems seem easier. to
solve.
Everyone in California has a favorite real-world water villain. Common
favorites are the wasteful Southern California homeowner, the farmer who
receives federally subsidized water, and the state and federal Endangered
Species Acts. The danger with villains is that they can lead to inaction.
Everyone points the finger at someone else, rather than recognizing that we
all need to change our water ways.
Villain #1: Wasteful Homeowners in Southern California
The favorite villains of many Northern Californians are the profligate
homeowners of Southern California who use water to grow luscious lawns,
fill and refill their swimming pools, and wash leaves from their driveways. In
this myth, water misuse is common in the Southland where people forget
that they are living in a former desert and import vast amounts of water,
including water from Northern California.
How the Myth Drives Debate
If Southern California homeowners are the problem, state policy
should focus on limiting their water use rather than on supplying them with
water. Imported water almost always comes from alternative environmental
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or local water uses, and there is no reason to incur those costs if the water is
not truly needed.
Moreover, other water users often argue that it is unjust and unfair to
force them to reduce their water use given profligate use by Southern
Californians. Farmers, for example, have argued that the State should not
impose conservation measures on them or permit agriculture-to-urban
water transfers when Southern Californians continue to waste water.
The-Reality
If Southern Californians are truly wasting water, water imports to the
region should be reduced - and the water reallocated to areas of origin or
other uses. But the image of Southern Californians as water villains is based
on misperception of actual water use across the state.
Average water use per person in the South Coast - where the majority
of Southern Californians live - is, in fact, among the lowest in California
(Figure 4). This stems partly from a cooler climate and denser land use than
inland areas. Statewide, outdoor water use averages over forty percent of
residential water use, and increases with hotter climates, larger lot sizes,
and a greater proportion of single-family homes. The Southern California
coast has the highest percentage of multifamily homes in the state, and its
home lots tend to be smaller (Hanak and Davis, 2006).
South Coast water utilities have also been among the most aggressive
in reducing per capita water use. An effective way to reduce water use is to
charge consumers higher rates for higher quantities consumed - known as
"increasing block rates." In 2003, almost two-third of the population of
California's southern coast paid increasing block rates. Only half of all
Californians paid such rates, including a mere thirteen percent of San
Joaquin Valley residents (Hanak, 2005). Water utilities in the South Coast
also provide significant incentives for conservation. For instance, the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has spent more than $185
million over the last decade encouraging water customers to instal) water-
efficient appliances, plant drought-resistant landscapes, and reduce overall
water use. In places like Los Angeles, reductions in manufacturing in the
early 1990s also reduced per capita use. Overall, the South Coast used
nearly 450,000 acre-feet less water in 2005 than a decade earlier, despite
having 2 million additional residents.9 The region also leads in reclaimed
water use.
The temptation is to simply change the villain in California water
policy from pool-loving residents of the South Coast to the urban and
suburban residents of Sacramento, the San Joaquin Valley, and other inland
areas. But the urban sector as a whole accounts for just over twenty percent
of water use in California, and utilities in virtually every region are working
9. Author calculations using Department of Water Resources data.
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to reduce per capita use. Making one region into a villain oversimplifies
the complex water demands in California and suggests that water
conservation is a bigger issue in one region or one sector rather than for the
state as a whole.
FIGURE 4:














Source: Department of Water Resources (provisional data).
-Note: Figure shows applied water use (for a definition, see the 'conserve our way out"
myth). The high per capita use in the Colorado River region stems in part from the golf tourism
industry .
10 For a discussion of the efforts of large urban water utilities, see California
Urban Water Agencies (2008).
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Villain #2: Subsidized Agriculture
The chief villains for many urban water users and environmental
advocates are the agricultural recipients of federally subsidized irrigation
water. The largest federal reclamation project in the United States is the
Central Valley Project ("CVP"), which supplies water to thousands of Central
Valley farms (as well as some urban water users) (Sax, et al., 2006). The
federal government subsidizes these supplies by allowing farmers to
reimburse project construction costs interest-free over a span of decades,
shifting to other users (such as hydroelectric projects) costs that exceed an
irrigator's "ability to pay," and charging below-cost energy rates for moving
the water. The estimated yearly subsidy to farmers receiving CVP water,
relative to the full-cost rate, is roughly $60 million (Environmental Working
Group, 2004).
In the minds of California's urban water users and environmental
reformers, subsidized rates paid by farmers in the CVP are unjustified and
unfair. Critics claim that the subsidies have undermined irrigators' incentive
to conserve and encouraged them to grow lower-value crops such as wheat,
grain, cotton, and rice that they believe should be grown elsewhere."
How the Myth Drives Debate
If federal reclamation subsidies are unfair and undermine agricultural
conservation, the most obvious solution is to eliminate them. In this spirit,
Congress has increased CVP prices to farmers under both the Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 1261) and the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act (CVPIA) of 1992 (106 Stat. 4600, 4706). To comply with these laws,"prices
for federal agricultural water are likely to increase by more than sixty-five
percent from 2000 to 2030. But in the meantime, CVP farmers continue to
receive a significant subsidy. Many argue that it would be fairer and more
efficient to speed up this process and eliminate the subsidy entirely.
The Reality
The view of subsidized farmers as water villains is based on
misunderstandings of the role of these subsidies in today's farm economy.
First, the claims of unfairness are unjustified, because most of today's
farmers have already paid for the subsidy through higher land prices: land
eligible for subsidized water is more expensive (Huffaker and Gardner,
1986).2 Although the windfall to original landowners might have been
11. There is a separate issue of whether federal crop subsidies create skewed
incentives to grow certain crops. Some California crops benefit from these subsidies
(notably rice, corn, about half of all cotton, and indirectly, alfalfa, an input to the
subsidized dairy industry). But most California acreage is planted to unsubsidized
crops.
12. Most farmers in California pay the actual operating cost of bringing the
water to their farms (even if they - like other water users - generally do not pay the
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unfair, current owners are receiving what the United States government led
them to expect they would receive when they purchased this land. Fairness
might imply locating the original landowners and stripping them of their
windfall, but it is difficult to argue that stripping current farmers of the
subsidy is "fair."' 3
Second, eliminating water subsidies is not the only way to encourage
farmers to conserve water. As noted above (Running out of water myth), the
economic efficiency of agricultural water use in California has increased
steadily due to gains in crop yields, switches to higher value crops, and
increases in irrigation efficiency. Since the early 1990s, water scarcity has
driven efficiency improvements among CVP farmers south of the Delta as
they seek to adjust to shortages from drought and regulatory changes. 4
Water markets also are encouraging more efficient use. Farmers who can
earn more than the cost of conserving water by selling the volume conserved
to other parties have an incentive to do so, even if they currently pay little
for water. For this reason, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
includes broad authorizations for CVP contractors to transfer water. Since
the early 1990s, there has been an active farm-to-farm market to move water
to water-short areas with higher value output (Hanak, 2003).
In sum, continued scarcity, along with higher water prices and other
market forces, is likely to further encourage both conservation and
conversion of land to less water-intensive crops, and an overall decline in
external environmental costs from reduced steam flows). Water delivered to farmers
from the State Water Project, local water projects, and the Colorado River Project is
essentially unsubsidized. In addition to its subsidized contractors, the CVP also
delivers over 2 million acre-feet to "settlement" and "exchange" contractors, who
were already receiving the water prior to the CVP, at very low (but not subsidized)
prices.
13. When Congress passed the original Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stat.
388), the subsidies were seen as a way to make the desert bloom. Today,
environmental damages and undesirable effects of that policy are apparent and
many reclamation projects have ultimately benefitted large rather than yeoman
farmers that Congress originally envisioned (Pisani, 1984; Arax and Wartzman, 2003).
But that does not reduce the fairness concerns of eliminating water subsidies on
which CVP and other federal project farmers have long relied.
14. Since the 1992 passage of the CVPIA, CVP contractors south of the Delta
have received reduced deliveries in most years, as part of a mitigation program to
provide more flows for salmon. Recent regulatory actions to protect the delta smelt
have led to further reductions (see Villain #3 and Figure 5). Many of these farmers
are now making cropping decisions based on the (much higher) price of water they
can obtain'on the water market, rather than the price of water delivered by the CVP.
Since the early 1990s, farmers have routinely paid more than $100 per acre-foot to
purchase supplemental water, and in the 2008 and 2009 seasons, when cutbacks
were severe, some farmers on the west side of the San loaquin Valley were paying as
much as $500 per acre-foot for stpplemental water (authors' communications with
farmers and water brokers). In contrast, contract prices for CVP water on the west
side run from $25 to $65 per acre-foot.
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agricultural water use (Department of Water Resources, 2005a).
Vflain #3: The Endangered Species Acts
To many users and commentators, particularly in the Central Valley
and Southern California, the true villains are the federal and state
Endangered Species Acts (ESA) (Wall Street. Journal, 2009). In this view,
environmentalists use these laws to force unreasonable reductions in
agriculture and urban water deliveries to protect a few species of worthless
bait fish. As some critics have put it, the problem plaguing California's
water system is not a natural drought but a "regulatory drought" from
environmental flow restrictions.
Many water users have been predicting that the Endangered Species
Acts would lead to water shortages since the federal government listed the
Sacramento winter-run Chinook salmon as threatened in 1989, followed by
the delta smelt in 1993. Since 2008, those predictions have seemed to
become reality, as pumping has been reduced following a federal judge
ruling that state and federal water managers were not adequately
considering the needs of fish species in the Delta in managing water
exports.
How the Myth Drives Debate
Seeing the Endangered Species Acts as villains has led some water
users to call for reducing legal protections for native species. The federal
Endangered Species Act of 1973 is currently one of the world's strongest
environmental laws. Having concluded that species are of inestimable
value, Congress prohibited the "taking" of endangered species under the
Endangered Species Act, regardless of the costs. Only the Endangered
Species Committee, a federal cabinet-level group sometimes referred to as
the "God Squad," can grant an exemption to the Act's proscriptions - an
action taken only twice to date. Some California water users now demand
that either the Committee be convened to allow more water to be exported
from the Delta or that Congress amend the Act.
The Reality
The recent Endangered Species Act restrictions have reduced water
supplies available for some water users.
However, the effects are often overstated. Recent delta smelt
restrictions come following a time of high sustained water exports and
coincide with the ongoing hydrologic drought. In all, they account for fifteen
to twenty percent of the recent declines in exports (Figure 5). Over the
longer term, delta smelt restrictions are likely to reduce Delta exports by
twenty percent to thirty percent on average (Department of Water Resources,
2008a, 2009b; Carlton, 2009) unless the smelt respond to large-scale habitat
improvements.
Even if the Endangered Species Acts did not exist, other federal and
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state laws designed to protect the environment would restrict water
withdrawals from California's rivers and streams. High withdrawals threaten
not only fish species, but also water quality, recreation, and aesthetics. As a
result, the federal Clean Water Act, state water quality laws, the public trust
doctrine, and various provisions of the California Fish and Game Code all
limit water operations to favor a variety of public purposes (e.g., Moyle, et
al., 1998, Craig, 2007; Sax, et al., 2006). State water law, moreover, requires
the State Water Resources Control Board to consider all beneficial uses,
including the maintenance of fish populations, in managing the State's
surface water (Sax, et al., 2006). Removing the Endangered Species Acts'
restrictions on water diversions would be unlikely to provide much
additional water for non-environmental uses, especially in the long run.
FIGURE 5:














Source: Author calculations using Department of Water Resources data on exports
(DAYFLOW and CDEC) and Department of Fish and Game fish survey data.
Note: ESA-related cutbacks are estimated at roughly 500,000 acre-feet of exports in 2008
and 2009, based on Department of Water Resources (2008a, b). The winter-run Chinook salmon
has been listed under the federal ESA since 1989 and the delta smelt since 1993.
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The restrictions of the Endangered Species Acts and other
environmental laws reflect public concern over the serious effects of human
actions on the natural environment and the costs of those impacts to all
California residents. As discussed below (value of ecosystems myth), healthy
ecosystems provide economically valuable services, such as water purification,
fisheries sustenance, recreation, and aesthetic value (Daily, 1997).
Replacing the Myth
There. are no true villains in California water policy. Responsibility for
water problems must be shared by all water users, and fundamentally
results from having a vibrant economy and society in an arid climate.
Villains are always someone else. Though rhetorically convenient, attempts
to vilify one group of water users for California's diverse water problems are
factually incorrect and get in the way of more productive policy discussions.
Despite inevitable water scarcity, both urban and agricultural water
users throughout the state have considerable opportunities to use and
manage water more efficiently (see the "running out of water' myth). It is
also possible to manage water for the environment more effectively, by
taking into account habitat and the quality and timing of flows (see the
"more water for fish" myth).
Myth: We Can Build Our Way Out of California's Water
Problems
People are always looking for the single magic bullet that will totally
change everything. There is no single magic bullet.
-Temple Grandin
The Myth
We would solve California's water problems if we only built more - lfill in
the blank ].
All too often, solutions to California's water management challenges
are summed up as a problem of insufficient construction of some form of
infrastructure, be it new surface storage, a peripheral canal to convey water
around the Delta, or desalination plants (or larger levees for flood control -
see the "safe from flooding" myth). The myth that we can build our way out
of the problem tends to appeal to politicians and the general public for its
simplicity; it is often promoted by special interests who stand to gain from a
particular investment, especially if someone else is paying for it. The danger
with focusing on these technological silver bullets is that they deflect
attention from potentially more effective and less costly alternatives (such
as water-markets, underground storage, and conservation), from the benefits
of coordinating many water management options, and from complementary
actions required to improve environmental conditions.
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Infrastructure Solution #1: New Surface Water Storage
Calls for "new surface storage" frequently accompany the "running out
of water" myth. Advocates often note that California's population has nearly
doubled since the state built the last major on-stream reservoir in the early
1980s and argue that new surface storage is needed to supply this growth
and replace the loss of Sierra Nevada snowpack storage predicted to occur
from global warming.
How the Myth Drives Debate
This myth assumes water supply is linked directly to surface water
storage capacity. Proponents often advocate large public subsidies for this
additional storage and insist on delaying other policy changes until
substantial funds are committed for suface storage expansion.
The Reality
Surface storage provides great flexibility to California's water system,
making it possible to carry water over to the dry season and to smooth out
year-to-year variations in precipitation. Surface storage operations can be
especially effective when employed in concert with other water management
actions, such as groundwater, water conservation, water markets, and other
actions. Reoperation of largely-existing surface water storage will play an
essential- role inimproving California's water system and adapting it to
changes in climate and water demands (Medellin, et al., 2008; Carpenter and
Georgakakos, 2001; Fissekis, 2008).
However, the myth is founded on the erroneous notion that large
unregulated flows will be available for new storage at an economically
reasonable cost. The myth persists because most people do not recognize
this technical limitation, and because a few local interests stand to gain
from state subsidies for new facilities.
Because large reservoirs already exist on most major streams in
California, expanding storage capacity has less potential to increase water
deliveries than it did in the past. The two largest and most frequently
advocated surface storage expansions would add 3.1 million acre-feet to the
roughly 41 million acre-feet of existing surface water storage capacity and
increase water deliveries by one percent, at an estimated cost of $6.4
billion." Surface storage is a costly way to expand water supplies in. part
because most favorable reservoir locations already have large dams,' 6 Early
15. Information from CALFED Surface Storage Investigations'as reported in
Department of Water Resources (2009a) and USBR (2008a, b) for Sites and
Temperance Flat reservoirs. Increased percent of agricultural and urban deliveries
are by authors' calculations (0.33 million acre-feet per year, relative to average
deliveries of 38 million acre-feet per year from 1980-2005 (see Figure 2).
16. For example, the San Joaquin River basin already has roughly 8.7 million
acre-feet of storage capacity and average annual runoff of only 6 million acre-feet.
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cost estimates from the Department of Water Resources range from roughly
$340 per acre-foot (Sites Reservoir in Colusa County) to over $1,000 per
acre-foot (Temperance Flat on the Upper San Joaquin River) (Table 1). The
actual cost for Sites Reservoir seems likely to be considerably higher, and
even a projected cost of $340 per acre-foot is likely to be prohibitively
expensive for most farmers. 7 This explains why most recent surface projects
have been built (and financed) by urban water agencies, and why some
farmers have been strong proponents of public subsidies."8
TABLE I
Costs of new water supply sources in California
year)
($ per acre-foot per
Method Low High
Conjunctive use and groundwater storage $10 $600
Water transfers 50 550
Agricultural water use efficiency (net) 145 240
Urban water use efficiency (gross) 230 635
Recycled municipal water 300 1300
Surface storage (state projects) 340 1070
Desalination, brackish 500 900
Desalination, seawater 900 2500
Sources: Department of Water Resources, 2009a; Department of Water Resources, 2007:
low estimate for surface storage; Department of Water Resources, 2005a: conjunctive use;
author estimates: water transfers.
Note: For conjunctive use, costs of water for banking may be additional. For most
options (except water use efficiency), estimates do not include delivery costs, which can be
substantial. For a definition of gross and net water use efficiency, see the "conserve our way
out" myth.
17. The $340 per acre-foot estimate assumes very high environmental
benefits and urban water quality benefits. Without these benefits, the. net cost per
acre-foot delivered rises to $616. (Author calculations using US Bureau of
Reclamation, 2008). Even a projected cost of $340 per acre-foot is likely to be too
expensive for most farmers.
18. Diamond Valley Lake in Southern California and Los Vaqueros reservoir
in Contra Costa County, both of which came on line in 1999 (Diamond Valley Lake,
n.d.; Contra Costa Water District, n.d.).
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Moreover, the value of surface storage as a replacement for the
snowpack is far from certain. If California's overall climate becomes drier (as
predicted by some models, e.g. Barnett, et al., 2008, Cayan, et al., 2009), new
surface storage provides little additional water supply because there is less
surplus water to store (Tanaka, et al., 2006; Connell, 2009; Madani and Lund,
in press). More active coordination between existing surface reservoirs and
.groundwater basins - with increased drought (over-year) storage kept
underground - could augment overall storage capabilities less expensively,
especially with climate change (Tanaka, et al., 2006; Connell, 2009).' 9
Surface storage operations become much more effective when
employed in concert with other water management actions, such as
groundwater, water conservation, water markets, and other actions.
Reoperation of existing surface water storage will play an essential role in
improving California's water system and adapting it to changes in climate
and water demands (Medellin, et al., 2008; Carpenter and Georgakakos,
2001; Fissekis, 2008).
Infrastructure Solution #2: A Peripheral Canal
The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta has long been at the center of
environmental, water supply, and land use conflicts, and its prominence in
public discussions has been heightened in recent years by concerns over
fragile levees and the fate of native fish species. One recurring proposal to
address these problems is to build a peripheral canal to convey export water
around, rather than through, the Delta. To many, particularly in areas that
depend on water exports, the peripheral canal has become the silver bullet
for addressing the Delta's woes.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The implication is that a peripheral canal should be built without
delay, allowing water exports to return immediately to their pre-2008 levels
or higher. This thinking has misled some water users to believe that Delta
conveyance is the only impediment to expanding water deliveries and has
distracted attention from many additional actions required to improve
environmental conditions in the Delta and California's water system as a
whole.
19. Some areas (notably Sacramento) would benefit from new surface storage
as part of the flood management system, especially with climate warming and earlier
spring runoff (Fissekis, 2008; Zhu, et al., 2007). Increased surface storage might also
enhance fish habitat, particularly to support cold water releases and flows during
droughts. However, such environmental enhancements have yet to be analyzed. For
environmental purposes, it would also be relevant to compare reoperation of
existing or expanded dams with the removal of some dams to allow fish to move
upstream to colder water and spawning grounds.
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The Reality
If carefully designed and managed, a peripheral canal seems to be the
best strategy for balancing environmental and economic goals for water
management in the Delta (Lund, et al., 2008). The current through-Delta
system is unsustainable for the Delta's native fishes and for human water
users (Lund, et al., 2008). By taking export water around the Delta, a canal
makes it possible to more separately manage water for exports and for the
environment. Flows within the Delta could return to.a more natural, variable
regime to benefit the Delta's native fishes.
A canal would also provide urban and farm water users with a more
reliable, cleaner source of water, while allowing water management within
the Delta to be tailored to the needs of fish and other desirable aquatic
organisms. By making it possible to continue moving water from northern
California to regions dependent on Delta exports, a canal would support
other water management actions, such as underground water storage,
reservoir reoperation, and water markets, and would make water supplies
more resilient to climate change (Tanaka, et al., 2006, 2008; Connell, 2009).
However, a peripheral canal alone will fix neither the Delta nor
California's water supplies and is unlikely to improve native fish populations
enough to immediately allow increases in exports above currently restricted
levels. A favorable outcome for native fishes depends on careful attention
to .environmental aspects of the project, as well as complementary
investments in fish habitat (Moyle and Bennett, 2008).
To succeed, the canal would need to be accompanied by a robust
governance package that establishes legal and procedural safeguards
against extracting too much water, and that ties achievement of ecosystem
management goals to water diversions. Since recent fish population
declines occurred during a period of high water exports (see Figure 5), some
reduction in water exports would likely be required with a canal, at least
until fish populations recover (lsenberg, et al., 2008a).2'
Infrastructure Solution #3: Seawater Desalination
To the general public, seawater desalination is often seen as the
ultimate technological fix for California's water supply. California appears to
be well positioned to harness desalination, with more than 2,000 miles of
ocean and bay coastline, a large coastal population, and a cutting edge
20. Even with significantly reduced exports, some form of peripheral canal is
likely to be much cheaper for water users (and the state's economy) than the status
quo or ending exports. The analysis on which this conclusion is based allowed for
export. reductions by up to 40 percent relative to a baseline of 6 million acre-feet,
with costs of a canal of nearly $10 billion in 2008 dollars (Lund, et al., 2008). If canal
costs prove to be substantially more expensive, this would lessen the economic
advantages of continuing Delta exports.
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technology sector. Some expect this new technology to become so
inexpensive that it will soon banish most water shortages and controversies,
almost reminiscent of the "too cheap to meter" hopes for nuclear power in
the 1950s.2
How the Myth Drives Debate
People point to declining desalination costs and examples from the
Middle East and Australia where desalination is now used and wonder why
California isn't pursuing this solution more aggressively. As with surface
storage, they argue for public subsidies to jumpstart desalination
investments.
The Reality
Desalination of brackish water (less than thirty percent as salty as
seawater) is already a proven technology in inland Southern California.
Seawater desalination might become useful in some situations: (1) isolated
coastal urban areas cut off from the state's wider supply network, such as
the Central Coast '(Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006); and (2) as a reliable
partial supply for urban areas-dependant on imported water. Reliability is
the primary motivation for planned desalination facilities in San Diego and
Orange Counties, as well as preliminary investigations in the San Francisco
Bay Area.
However, seawater desalination faces several obstacles which make it
unlikely to become a major water source for California in the near future.
The technology remains expensive and poses some major environmental
challenges, including trapping (or "entraining") marine life at intakes, safe
disposal of brine by-product, and high energy use. For decades,
technologists have speculated that inexpensive commercial-scale
desalination technology would become affordable and commonplace soon
(White, 1966; Wiener, 1972). Recent reviews find widely variable
desalination costs, with desalination of brackish water costing about $400
per acre-foot to $600 per acre-foot and seawater desalination costing about
$600 per acre-foot $1000 per acre-foot for large units without unusual brine
disposal costs (Karagiannis and Soldatos, 2008; Texas Water Development
Board, n.d.). For California, current cost estimates are somewhat higher,
likely reflecting greater costs of brine disposal and environmental mitigation
for seawater plant location.22 Even with continued technological advances,
21. Lewis L. Strauss, Speech to the National Association of Science Writers
(Sept. 16, 1954) ("Our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap
to meter ... ").
22. These estimates are wide-ranging and uncertain due to the differences in
cost accounting methods (with low estimates often excluding subsidies or assuming
100% capacity utilization), the evolving nature of the technology, and lack of
experience with large-scale desalination in California (Cooley, Gleick, Wolff, 2006).
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seawater desalination is likely to remain relatively costly for urban uses, and
is unlikely to become viable for directly supplying irrigation water for
agriculture (Table 1).
Replacing the Myth
Although new infrastructure can contribute to California's water supply
solutions, it is not a panacea in terms of costs or environmental benefits.
Billions of dollars of infrastructure investments are urgently needed,
but mostly for maintaining or rehabilitating aging facilities (Hanak and
Barbour, 2005), refurbishing major storage and conveyance systems to
reduce their environmental impacts (temperature controls on dam outlets
and more fish-friendly diversions), and improving connections within the
water system to improve flexibility in operations. Infrastructure investments
are usually best financed by local beneficiaries and best employed within a
portfolio approach to water management, which orchestrates a wide range
of actions and includes new infrastructure along with water markets,
underground storage, reuse, and conservation.
Myth: We Can Conserve Our Way Out of California's Water
Problems.
Contrary to the expectations of policy makers, on-farm efficiency
improvements have failed to consistently conserve water on a broader
geographic scale in real-world practice. Worse yet, they sometimes
result in the further depletion of scarce water supplies.
-Ray Huffaker (2008)
The Myth
The water conservation myth implies that California can adapt to
changing conditions by focusing primarily on water use efficiency to the
exclusion of other alternatives. Examples of countries such as Australia,
where daily residential water use is reported to have fallen to roughly 40
gallons per capita ("gpcd") during the recent drought (versus about 145 gpcd
in California) are used to highlight the scope for savings (Whyte, 2009).23
The danger with this myth lies in overestimating the real water savings th at
can be achieved through conservation. Adherence to the myth distracts
discussions from the need for more sweeping changes in water institutions,
infrastructure, and management.
23. Residential use is a component of total urban use (estimated at 201
gallons per capita per day in California in 2005 - see Figure 3), which also includes
commercial and industrial uses.
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How the Myth Drives Debate
The idea that improvements in urban and agricultural water use
efficiency could free up enough water for population growth and increased
environmental use is appealing.- It places blame for water problems on
other water users (the "villain" myth) while providing a silver bullet solution.
Environmentalists often promote conservation as an alternative to new
infrastructure (see the "build our way out" myth). Following more than a
decade of financial support to urban water utilities implementing
conservations measures, California policymakers have recently proposed
requiring reductions in per capita urban water use by twenty percent, in the
expectation that this will free up significant supplies for other purposes.24
The Reality
Improvements in urban and agricultural water use efficiency have
already helped California adapt to scarcity, and continued reductions in
water use can help California cope with droughts and shortages (see the
"running out of water" myth). Reducing water withdrawals from streams and
groundwater basins can yield environmental benefits, including improved
streamflow,25 reduced pollution run-off into rivers, streams, and beaches
(Noble, et al., 2003), and reduced energy use for acquiring and treating water
(California Energy Commission, 2005).
But public policy discussions about water conservation often
overestimate potential water savings by failing to distinguish between net
and gross water use. Net (or "consumptive") water use refers to water
consumed by people or plants, embodied in manufactured goods,
evaporated, or discharged to saline waters. Once this water is used, it
cannot be recaptured. Gross (or "applied") water use refers to water that
runs through the taps of a home or business, or is applied to fields - not all
of which is consumed. Some of it - known as "return flow" - is available for
reuse, because it returns to streams and irrigation canals or recharges
groundwater basins. Conservation measures often target reductions in
gross water use. But because of return flow, net water savings are often
lower (and never higher) than gross water savings. Only net water savings
provide more water..
In agriculture, achieving significant net water savings generally
requires switching to crops that consume less water or reducing irrigated
land area, two measures that typically reduce farm profits and are therefore
24. State Water Resources Control Board (2009b) addresses the governor's
call for a 20 percent reduction by 2020. This goal is also addressed in legislation
proposed in 2009.
. 25. Streamflow improvements can be significant locally even if there are no
net savings from conservation measures, because return flows do not generally
return to the same location as diversions.
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costly.26 By contrast, irrigation efficiency investments, which can increase
farm profits, may reduce gross water use per acre, but increase net water use
on farms by making it easier for farmers to stretch their gross supplies
across additional acres of cropland."
Similar issues arise for urban water conservation. Outdoors, switching
from thirsty lawns to low-water using plants (a crop switch) can greatly
reduce net water use. But reducing landscape overwatering (a reduction in
gross water use) will only generate net savings if the excess water had not
previously been recaptured in a stream or a groundwater basin.
Opportunities for net savings from indoor water conservation depend
on location. Almost all indoor water use returns to the system as treated
wastewater. Thus, indoor conservation in coastal areas, which discharge
wastewater to the sea, produces substantial net water savings. But indoor
conservation in Sacramento - where wastewater discharges to the
Sacramento River and can be reused by others before reaching the ocean -
has little effect on California's net water use.
Not distinguishing between net and gross water savings in public
discussions can create unrealistically high expectations for water
conservation and inaccurate evaluations of the benefits of specific
conservation measures: For instance, the large potential savings from urban
conservation reported in the 2005 California Water Plan Update are gross, not
net, savings (Department of Water Resources, 2005). The same is true for the
governor's plan to reduce gross per capita urban water use twenty percent by
2020 (State Water Resources Control Board, 2009); though useful, it would
produce significantly less than a twenty percent reduction in net urban water
use.
Public discussions also frequently fail to acknowledge -that water
conservation has implementation and operating costs, just like other
actions (Table 1). Some conservation quickly pays for itself (e.g., reducing
hot water use through low-flow fixtures saves on both energy and applied
water) (Gleick, et al., 2003). But other actions can be quite costly (e.g.,
replacing lawns with low-water landscapes) (Hanak and Davis, 2006).
Conservation also can reduce the flexibility of urban areas to cope with
droughts because the greater efficiency of use often reduces the potential
for inexpensive conservation in times of shortage.
26. Agricultural areas draining to the Salton Sea are a major exception, where
any use reduction generates net water savings. For some crops (e.g., alfalfa and wine
grapes), "stress irrigation" - which strategically waters crops less than normally
needed - can reduce consumptive use (creating net savings) by ten percent to fifteen
percent.
27. This issue arises because farmers pay for gross, not net, water use.
Subsidizing irrigation efficiency improvements often encourages these acreage
extensions. See Scheierling, et al., 2006; Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2008; Huffaker,
2008; Evans and Sadler, 2008; Clemmens, et al., 2008; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2009.
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Replacing the Myth
Water conservation is important, but its effectiveness is often
overstated.
Substantial reductions in net water use are essential for California.
Such reductions are likely to arise from increases in the economic efficiency
of irrigation (where less net water use provides a similar or greater level of
service, e.g., "more crop per drop") combined with reductions in water use
and service levels (e.g., from fallowing irrigated land or seasonally drying
lawns), and from reductions in applied water use by residents and
businesses in coastal communities. As with building new infrastructure,
conservation should be part of a portfolio approach to water management,
which is much more likely to be successful in addressing California's
complex, locally varied, and evolving water problems (Jenkins, et al., 2004).
Myth: Water Markets Can Resolve California's Water
Problems
When the well is dry, we know the worth of water.
-Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac, 1746
The Myth
Water marketing is a silver bullet for many economists and
businessmen (and some environmentalists) who view voluntary transfers as
the ideal mechanism to redress supply and demand imbalances that result
from variable water supplies and long-term shifts in demands. Markets are
also the favorite tool of those who view water as a commodity, and water
rights as a property right like any other. Like other silver bullet solutions
(the "build our way out" and "conserve our way out" myths), the dangers of
this myth lie in failing to see limitations of the approach and missing out on
opportunities to combine it with other water management actions.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The implications of a markets-first approach are two-fold. First, as
with conservation, there is a tendency to view other infrastructure
investments and actions as unimportant. Second, there is an emphasis on
removing regulatory barriers to transactions, so that buyers and sellers can
maximize the movement of water. As a result, a markets-first approach risks
limiting the use of other water management actions, even actions which
would improve the effectiveness of water markets.
The Reality
Temporary transfers of water from lower to higher value uses often
help redress shortages during droughts, and long-term or permanent
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transfers facilitate the evolution of water rights as the economy and climate
change. Transfers also can increase environmental flows. The development
of a market in California since the late 1980s has demonstrated the value of
temporary, permanent, and environmental water transfers (Hanak, 2003;
Howitt and Hanak, 2005; Hollinshead and Lund, 2006). Even with
restrictions on Delta pumping, increased transfers within the San Joaquin
Valley (which has significant disparities in water rights and agricultural
productivity) and Southern California (primarily from the Colorado River to
urban areas) could lessen the economic hardships of drought and water
shortages (Tanaka, et al., 2008). With climate change, the ability to transfer
water from wetter to dryer regions is likely to become increasingly valuable
(Tanaka, et al., 2006; Connell, 2009).
However, the idea that transfers alone can redress supply and demand
imbalances is mistaken; transfers only work well when appropriate
infrastructure can move water from place to place, For instance, an ability to
move water through the Delta is now essential for any water transfers from
the Sacramento Valley (e.g., conserved water from northern California rice
farms or stored groundwater or surface water) to cities and farms south of
the Delta. During the summer of 2009, this market was curtailed by
pumping restrictions in the Delta.
And although some regulatory flexibility is healthy, the most important
restrictions on transfers are to ensure that water markets avoid major harm
to other water rights holders, the environment, and the public. In particular,
water transfers can cause "third party" effects - physical and financial effects
on parties other than the buyer and the seller, including other water users
(people and fish) and the local economy in the vicinity of the sellers.
California law and local ordinances limit transfers to protect parties
physically affected by transfers, including downstream water right holders
and instream beneficial uses (Hanak, 2003; Gray, 1996). State law and local
ordinances aim to protect local groundwater users from overdraft due to
unfettered exports of groundwater. Such protections essentially prevent
water from being transferred if other water users or the environment would
be harmed.
Financial effects, or "pecuniary externalities," can result when sales of
agricultural water reduce or eliminate farming in an area. Concern over
negative impacts on the local economy (lower farm employment,
agricultural input and processing sales, and lower tax receipts) runs high in
many farm communities. California law does not protect against these types
of impacts (though it does require disclosure of sales of more than twenty
percent of the water in an area). Also, water transfers that do not pay a fair
28. See Section 1745.05 of the Water Code. In addition, chapter 2.6 of the
Water Code (sections 380-87) requires the State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") to determine that a long-term transfer will not "unreasonably affect the
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share of the cost of use of conveyance infrastructure can mask the true
environmental and infrastructure costs of transfers, and result in public
subsidies for market transactions.
One of the greatest values of water markets is their role in supporting
flexibility and cooperation in the management of California's highly
decentralized water system (Pulido, et al., 2004). Water markets are not like
most commodity markets, where buyers and sellers never meet or negotiate
directly. Instead, developing deals - especially for longer-term arrangements
- typically requires significantcollaboration, to sort out safeguardsand
logistics. Water markets have greatly increased cooperation among water
districts as those seeking additional water (southern California and Bay Area
cities and some San Joaquin Valley farmers) pay others to voluntarily
conserve water (e.g., Imperial Irrigation District), store water (e.g.,
Semitropic Irrigation District), operate conjunctive use programs (e.g.; Glenn
Colusa Irrigation District), reoperate reservoirs (e.g., Yuba County Water
Authority), or fallow land (e.g., Imperial Irrigation District). In this sense,
water markets allow multiple parties to "get better together," instead of
fighting over water rights.
Replacing the Myth
Water markets provide important incentives for -cooperation and
coordination of a portfolio of water management activities. Markets alone
do not produce water. Water markets often become more economically and
environmentally effective when coordinated with other water management
actions (Pulido, et al., 2004; Jenkins, et al., 2004) and rely on well-
established property rights for water that allow for market transactions.
Instead of seeking salvation from a single solution, a portfolio
approach, orchestrating a wide range of management actions including
conservation, water markets, underground storage, and new infrastructure, is
much more likely to be successful in addressing California's complex, locally
varied, and evolving water problems (Jenkins, et al., 2004). Many water
agencies have adopted a portfolio approach to long-range water planning,
which can better balance cost and reliability, much in the same way that
financial portfolio planning seeks to balance risk and return. Crafting such
water management portfolios requires skilled use of data and analysis,
which has been underdeveloped in the quest for silver bullets, be they in the
form of infrastructure, water conservation, or water markets.
overall economy of the area from which the water is being transferred." This section
of the water code applies only to public agencies, which are also able to use the
more general water-transfer provisions in chapter 10.5. The latter do not require the
SWRCB to look at economic impacts on local communities. To our knowledge, the
provision in chapter 2.6 has never been used.
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IV. Ecosystem Myths
Myth: Healthy Aquatic Ecosystems Conflict with a Healthy
Economy
Nature provides a free lunch, but only if we control our appetites.
-William Ruckelshaus
The Myth
This classic "fish versus people" argument is imbedded in the belief
that natural resources should be used to generate economic wealth, and
that any resource not so used is somehow "wasted." In this view,
environmental water uses and healthy watersheds have little or no
economic value, so allocating water to the environment or imposing water
quality regulations leads to much greater economic losses than potential
benefits.
Though rhetorically convenient for individuals and regions suffering
from water scarcity or facing costs of implementing water quality
regulations, this myth overlooks or undervalues the real economic benefits
of healthy ecosystems. The dangers are under-investing in environmental
actions and failing to pursue water management strategies that serve both
the natural environment and overall economic well-being.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The myth of inevitable conflict between economic and environmental
water uses drives much recent debate over water allocation, particularly
during times of scarcity (see the "villain" myth). It also fuels resistance to
the regulation of polluted runoff caused by urban activities and farming
operations.
The Reality
Environmental regulations often interfere with traditional economic
activities. For instance, the recently imposed environmental regulations
on Delta water exports cost several thousand farm jobs (Howitt, et al.,
2009b), and uncertainties about Delta supplies are raising concerns in
some Southern California cities about the ability to approve new
development.'
Yet environmental water uses also add economic value to California.
This is not always readily apparent, because the market generally does not
29. See Bowles and Lee (2007, 2008) for approval delays in Riverside County
and Los Angeles Times (2008) and Steinhauer (2008) for a more general discussion.
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put a price on environmental flows, healthy watersheds, or the services
that they provide (National Research -Council, 2005a; Brauman, et al.,
2007). But new tools are emerging to measure and economically value
these services (see "Valuing Ecosystem Services"). For example, instream
flows support recreational and commercial fisheries, enable water-based
recreation, and increase water quality (Daily, et al., 1997). Wetlands and
healthy watersheds also reduce flood risks. Watershed protections
nationally save cities billions of dollars per year in avoided treatment
costs (Postel and Thompson, 2005);. San Francisco alone saves tens of
millions of dollars per year from receiving water from the pristine Hetch
Hetchy watershed (Null and Lund, 2006).30 Sacramento Valley rice farming
has developed substantial mutual benefits with wildfowl (Bird, Pettygrove,
and Eadie, 2000). And most people are willing to pay for the continued
existence of native species and landscapes, even if they may never see
them (sometimes called a "non-use" or "existence" value).
One consequence of the failure to put a price tag on environmental
flows is that many environmental water demands remain unsatisfied.3' In
addition, public and private decisions often neglect the economic costs of
environmental effects from traditional agricultural and urban water uses.
For example, many groundwater basins are contaminated by
accumulations of nutrients and pesticides from farming or from leaching
of industrial chemicals (Oster, et al., 1994; California Department of
Pesticide Regulation, 2009). Although environmental regulations have
begun to hold water users, dischargers, and land use agencies responsible,
others generally bear the costs of the environmental degradation - through
diminished recreational opportunities, higher drinking water treatment
costs, greater health risks, increased flooding, and other effects - including
.health risks for wildlife and plants.
The recent settlement on the San Joaquin River, which will decrease
agricultural diversions to benefit salmon habitat, provides a good
illustration of the importance of considering environmental values in water
management decisions. The estimated gains in economic value from
30. Of course, this water quality benefit also comes with the significant
environmental cost of flooding the Hetch Hetchy valley in Yosemite National Park
with reservoir construction in the early twentith century.
31. A study of environmental water uses for the 2005 State Water Plan found
that, in 2000 and 2001 (normal and dry years respectively), the state failed to meet
nine important environmental flow objectives by almost a million acre feet
(Environmental Defense, 2005). And whereas urban and agricultural water use
generally varies by no more than ten to twenty percent between wet and dry years,
environmental water use can drop by over fifty percent during droughts (Department
of Water Resources, 2009a).
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Valuing Ecosystem Services
Ecosystem services are benefits that ecosystems
provide to humans. Healthy rivers and watersheds, for
example, can provide salmon and waterfowl, whitewater
for kayakers, and clean drinking water for cities. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) gives four
ecosystem services categories:
Provisioning Services - providing food and water.
Regulating Services - sequestering carbon and
reducing soil erosion.
Cultural Services - providing recreation and spiritual
renewal.
Supporting Services - promoting soil fertility and
primary production.
It was historically difficult to measure and value these
.services, except for the few services (e.g., food) traded in
the marketplace. Scientists today, however, are
developing techniques to estimate how various actions
will affect ecosystem services and to value those
services in economic and non-economic terms
(DeGroot, Wilson and Boumans, 2002; Daily, et al.,
2009). A recent study by the Science Advisory Board for
the US Environmental Protection Agency (2009)
concludes that the government should better integrate
ecosystem services into decision making and discusses
a variety of methods for valuing ecosystem services.
These methods include:
Measures of Public Attitudes - surveys and focus
groups that elicit public preferences for ecosystem
services.
Economic Methods - methods to estimate how much
people are willing to spend to avoid losing a service.
Civil Valuation Methods - public referenda or
initiatives provide information about how much the
voting population values particular services.
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restored flows (in terms of recreation, lower treatment costs, and the
"existence" value of restored flows) can far exceed farm revenue losses.3
As California's. economy continues to shift from resource-dependent
goods production to activities more demanding of environmental quality
for recreation and other ecosystem services, it will become increasingly
important to manage water resources for both commercial value and
healthy ecosystems.
Replacing the Myth
Healthy -ecosystems provide significant value to California's economy,
partially and sometimes fully offsetting their costs to traditional economic
sectors. Direct benefits include improvements in recreation, commercial
fishing, and drinking and agricultural water quality, and indirect benefits
include improvements in the quality of life in California.
California must find ways to manage water jointly for environmental
and commercial benefits. Better accounting of water use and its economic
and environmental benefits and costs can help guide policies for watershed
management.
Myth: More Water Will Lead to Healthy Fish Populations
It takes more than water to restore a wetland.
-J. B. Zedler (2000)
The Myth
Ongoing debates over the peripheral canal, rewatering the San Joaquin
River, restoring steelhead runs in southern California, federal relicensing of
hydropower dams in the Sierra, and restoring endangered and threatened
salmon and sucker fish in the Klamath River all involve a common,
contentious question: "How much water do the fish need?" This question
stems from. the assumption that simply allocating more water will lead to
healthy fish populations. Those involved in managing water resources know
this assumption is wrong. Yet it remains the primary (if not sole) focus of
debate, often to the detriment of other, more important factors for species
recovery.
32. Annual losses in net agricultural revenues were estimated at $14.5 million
to $38 million, depending on the extent of water marketing. Environmental benefits
included $45 million in increased value of recreation, plus improved water quality for
downstream urban and agricultural users, and non-use value from the restoration of
the river. (Hanemann, 2005)
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How the Myth Drives Debate
The assumption that more water is sufficient to recover fish species
simplifies current policy debates, making them manageable for
decisionmakers and stakeholders. It is in the interest of utilities and water
contractors to focus on-this issue because it implies that a science-based,
quantifiable solution exists with reasonable certainty. It is in the interest of
the financially strapped fisheries agencies because it allows them to focus
on monitoring flows using existing stream gauges, rather than expanding
efforts to measure fish populations. Elected officials also focus on this
issue because it is easy to communicate and understand - add more water,
get more fish, and other water users get the rest. The result has been a
discussion of environmental flows disconnected from other fish needs and
less effective in supporting fish populations.
The Reality
The myth that more water is sufficient for healthy fish populations
rests on a basic truth: To state the obvious, fish need water.33 Streamflow
diversions and groundwater pumping have significantly diminished fish
numbers, with great impacts on Central Valley, Lahontan, Central Coast, and
South Coast rivers and streams (Moyle, 2002; Moyle, et al., 2009). Perhaps
the most striking example is the complete dewatering of the San Joaquin
River and the resulting extirpation of spring run Chinook salmon (Brown,
2000; Moyle, 2002). Clearly, in such cases more water is necessary for
improving fish stocks.
But more water alone is rarely sufficient. The best answer to the
question "How much water do the fish need?" - one that reflects the reality
of allocating water to the environment - is the maddeningly vague "It
depends." Here's why:
First, more water is not always better for fish. If water is of the wrong
quality - in terms of temperature, sediment, nutrients, and contaminants - it
does little good and may do harm. Less water, of better quality, might
support larger and healthier desirable fish populations.34 Fishes adapted to
cold, clear waters, such as salmonids, do not benefit from higher releases of
warm, nutrient-rich water (National Research Council, 2005b). Alternatively,
fishes that evolved in warmer waters tend to do poorly when water
33. Californians typically divert and consume much of the flow from the
state's major rivers, averaging twenty-five percent of Sacramento River flows and over
half of flows in the San loaquin River (Calculations by William Fleenor using
Department of Water Resources data).
34. For instance, riparian shading and temperature control devices on dams
can provide water temperatures that support fish without dedicating additional water
(Null, et al., 2009; Vermeyen, 1997). See also Welsh, et al., 2001.
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temperatures are made artificially cold by releases from dams (Clarkson and
Childs, 2000).
Second,. water without sufficient physical habitat does little good and
may cause harm. Habitat needs connectivity and complexity, along with the
ability to adjust to changing conditions (Graf, 2001; Zedler 2000). For
example, increasing winter and spring flows on leveed or channelized rivers
cut off from the floodplain provides little benefit and may even harm scarce
in-channel habitat.
Third, poorly timed flows can be ineffective or counterproductive.
Water allocations for the environment should be viewed differently from
irrigation water allocations, with yearly or monthly allocations at some fixed
flow rate. California's Mediterranean climate has large seasonal, annual,
and spatial variations in flows, temperatures, and physical habitat. Few
efforts to manage ecosystems, much less individual fish species, adequately
account for this variability when prescribing increases in flow (Baron, et al.,
2002; Moyle, et al., 2009).
Fourth, many factors can affect wild fish populations, such as salmon
and steelhead, that migrate between rivers and the ocean. These factors
range from ocean conditions, to rates and timing of pumping from the South
Delta pumping plants, to interactions with fish of hatchery origin (Moyle and
Bennett, 2008). Thus, putting more water down a river without addressing
problems at other locations may not significantly improve fish populations.
Finally, science simply cannot accurately and precisely predict how
much water the fish need. Large uncertainties are unavoidable in assessing
the magnitude, timing, frequency, and duration of ecological flows. To
address these uncertainties, adaptive management strategies, which view all
environmental flows as experimental and establish procedures for adjusting
them, will be required (National Research Council, 2004). To date, no major
California water projects have successfully implemented adaptive
management.
Replacing the Myth
Native aquatic species need more than water to prosper. To support
native fish populations, water flows must have appropriate seasonal and
interannual variability, abundant and complex physical habitat, high water
quality, and be protected from the effects of invasive species.
Effective water policy must pragmatically embrace this complexity.
Solutions will need to be flexible, account for the natural variability of water and
the surrounding environment, and account for the complexity of ecosystem
responses. Fisheries agencies will need greater resources to adequately
monitor the effects of changing flows, or they will risk making serious errors in
flow prescriptions. Most challenging of all: effective solutions will require
greater flexibility and creativity on the part of agricultural and urban water
providers and may reduce the reliability of water supplies.
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Myth: Restoring Native Ecosystems is Essential for the
Recovery of Native Species
Ecological restoration efforts should aim to conserve and restore
historical ecosystems where viable, while simultaneously preparing to
design or steer emerging novel ecosystems to ensure maintenance of
ecological goods and services.
-ST. Jackson and R.J. Hobbes (2009), p. 567
The Myth
As demonstrated by the durability of. the Endangered Species Act and
the Clean Water Act., society values native species and healthy ecosystems
that provide habitat for native species. Some interpret this to mean that
California's native ("natural") ecosystems must be restored to pre-European
onditions. Often, this unattainable ideal has polarized discussions and
hindered serious environmental management.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The notion of "restoration" was a useful guide in the early days of
erivironmental management. Early efforts focused on attempting to
discover and recreate a pre-development condition that would be suitable to
support native species. This ideal is no longer attainable because
California's built environment is fully integrated with the natural
environment, and both are undergoing rapid change (Jackson and Hobbes,
2009). While most scientists and policymakers recognize that true
restoration is not possible, "restoration" remains a flashpoint in public
debates.
Rhetorical perpetuation of the myth has three potentially negative
policy outcomes. First, for some water users, it becomes an excuse for not
taking action to protect native species: if native ecosystems cannot be
"restored," how can we save the species that depend on them? (Or, if we
can't restore the Delta to its natural state, why should we waste all the
money, time, and water keeping delta smelt from going extinct?) Second,
for some environmental interests, the myth implies that native species can
only recover if additional development is stopped and existing development
is reversed to return the system to pre-development conditions. But
restoration efforts based mainly on seeking a return to hypothetical pre-
development conditions will, due to ever-changing conditions, prove
ineffective at sustaining native species, and keep water supply management
in turmoil. Third, and most importantly, the conflict between these first two
views distracts attention from promising means of managing water that
serve both the natural environment and societal well-being in the longer
term.
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The Reality
Some features, of native ecosystems will be needed to support native
species.
However, there are no pristine ecosystems left in California and
probably not in the world. For California, pre-development conditions are
usually considered to be those before the Gold Rush era, which is fairly
arbitrary because the native peoples also modified the landscapes in major
ways (e.g., keeping forests open by fire).
Large numbers of non-native species and changes in land and water
development have irrevocably altered California's ecosystems, and will
continue to effect changes in the future. Wilderness areas still retain human
recreational and other uses, while supporting non-native plant and animal
species. Our forests and rivers have to be continually managed to provide
the high-value ecosystem services we expect from them. Indeed, many
ser vices, such as fisheries or erosion control, come from non-native species.
Thus even contemporary "natural" ecosystems can be very different in
species composition than they were historically, depend on human
intervention, and continue to change. But the native species that are
maintained in such systems are often our most sensitive indicators of the
dondition of the ecosystems.
Instead of aiming to restore native ecosystems, we can usefully apply
our perceptions of the historical systems to set guidelines for maintaining or
even recreating functional environments. There is growing recognition that
ecosystems that function in more "natural" ways provide many services that
are valuable to humans and native species (see the "ecosystems versus
economy" myth). Thus the restoration of flows to the lower Owens River not
only recreated habitat for the Owens tui chub and for a trout fishery, but
reflooded alkaline Owens Lake. This reduced toxic dust blown by storms
from the surface of the dry lake, which threatened human health over a wide
area. However, the ecosystem that provides these services.today is different
in many ways from the ecosystem that once existed in the same area. The
trout fishery in the Owens River, for example, is for brown trout, a species
imported from Europe. Most ecosystems in California are similar in this
respect.
While the restoration myth seems to exist more in rhetoric than in
reality, the myth still very much colors the debate on how to manage
ecosystems into the future, achieving a balance between commercial
benefits to humans and benefits to wild organisms. Aesthetically, we know
in a general sense what we want: unpolluted streams that flow with clear
cold water through shady forests and estuaries and lakes with abundant fish
and birds without mats of noxious algae or floating garbage. But the exact
characteristics of such ecosystems tend to be vague both in people's minds
and in policy. Rather than talking about restoration as the universal goal for
ecosystem and habitat protection, it might be more useful to focus on
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reconciliation as the goal, where reconciled ecosystems possess the
desirable aesthetic traits and wild species but are well integrated into
human landscapes (Rosenzweig, 2003).
The concept of reconciliation as the underlying idea of our interactions
with the environment recognizes that we humans are committed to large-
scale ecosystem management for our own benefit and those of native
species. It recognizes that we need healthy ecosystems but that the nature
of these ecosystems will be determined largely by our actions. For
California water policy, this means, for example, that we need to make
decisions about how we want our aquatic ecosystems to look and work.
While we talk about flows being "restored" to the San Joaquin' River, for
example, we are in reality creating a very different river from the historical
river that once existed in the San Joaquin Valley. The reconciled river will no
longer be dry and will have small salmon runs, but it will also contain many
non-native species and flow through constructed channels in many places.
In managing this river in the future, we will constantly be making decisions
to favor different organisms and even different aesthetic values. But the
basic template for the reconciled river is being laid down now. This is not a
bad way to approach future "restoration" projects.
Replacing the Myth
Tomorrow's healthy ecosystems, though resembling natural systems in
some ways, -will depend heavily on continued human management and have
different species composition than historic ecosystems.
Managing the system for the benefit of native species often works to
benefit humans as well, especially from a long-term perspective. As
California's economy continues to shift towards activities that demand high
environmental quality for clean water, recreation, and other ecosystem
services, it will become increasingly important to manage water resources
for both commercial value and healthy ecosystems. But the healthy
ecosystems of the future will not be identical to those of the past and many
will need to be quite different.
Some of the characteristics of reconciled ecosystems would include:
(i) provision of ecosystems services such a clean water, recreation, and
fisheries, (ii) high aesthetic value (which can change through time; what we
value highly today ma' not be the same as what future generations will
value), (iii) resiliency - a high ability to absorb disturbance while
maintaining basic ecosystem structure and function (Walker and Salt, 2006),
and (iv) self-sustaining populations of desirable species, especially native
species.
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V. Flood Management Myth
Myth: Current Flood Protection Standards Keep
Communities Safe
Hazard always arises from the interplay of. social and biological




Federal law generally restricts urban development and requires that
property owners have flood insurance within a designated "100-year"
floodplain (having more than a l-in-100 chance of flooding in any single
year)." This policy framework has fostered the myth that current flood
protection standards keep communities safe. The danger in this myth lies in
encouraging new development in high risk areas and lulling existing
homeowners into thinking they are safe and don't need flood insurance
outside of the 100-year floodplain.
How the Myth Drives Debate
Since the introduction of new federal policies in the 1960s,
communities have sought to avoid development restrictions and the need
for flood insurance for their residents by making investments to meet the
new minimal federal standards of protection. As a consequence, billions of
dollars of flood management infrastructure - including levees, dams, by-
passes, and other river modifications - have occurred under the mistaken
belief that they provide safety for new development. Adhering to this myth
allows public officials and land development interests to accept minimal
levels of flood protection at little risk to themselves.
This policy also has also encouraged the ecological separation of
floodplain land from rivers and discouraged land uses, such as farming, open
space, and wildlife habitat that might be more compatible with occasional
floodplain inundation. As is common in coastal hurricane areas, but so far
not widely successful in California, raising and otherwise making structures
resistant to flooding can sometimes reduce flood damages with less
35. In the 1960s the federal government established the Nationa'l Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) and set national minimum standards for the performance
of federally-supported flood control projects. To qualify for flood insurance,
communities must restrict new development from the reach of floodwaters in the
'100-year flood" (the flood with a l-in-100 chance of occurring in any single year).
Owners, in turn, must generally only hold flood insurance for properties within
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA), deemed to have a higher likelihood of flooding.
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investment in flood protection infrastructure and environmental damage.
The Reality
In all but the wettest years, California's flood management systems
prevent significant flood damage or loss of life. The federal requirements
force communities to acknowledge the possibility of flooding, even if they
have yet to experience a large, damaging flood.
But in the aggregate, traditional investments in flood infrastructure,
while decreasing flood frequency, often increase flood risk by creating a false
sense of security (White, 1945; Carolan, 2005; Pinter, 2005,'Montz and Tobin,
2008). The underpinnings of the myth that our flood protection standards
keep communities safe lie in how we manage for risk, our perceptions of
risk, and the way traditional flood infrastructure increases risk (Mount, 1995;
Carolan, 2005; Galloway, et al., 2008).
Federal standards provide only a uniform standard for frequency of
flooding and neglect economic and social consequences from flooding.
Measures of economic risk consider both the likelihood of flooding and its
consequences, such as property damage, loss of life, and broader economic
disruptions (Helm, 1996; Plate, 2002).36 With uniform flood frequency
standards, densely populated urban communities on a deep floodplain (with
flood depths over house eaves, risking loss of life) are regulated in the same
way as suburban communities on a flood terrace (flooding to the doorstep
without loss of life). As an illustration, Figure 6 shows flood depths for the
Sacramento area in the event of levee failure. Under the federal standards,
shaded properties are considered to have the same levels of protection,
even though they face flood depths ranging from just one foot to over ten
feet. An economic risk calculation would account for differences in damage
exposure and require higher protection in areas with higher losses from
flooding (Van Dantzig, 1956; Zhu, et al., 2007).
In general, the federal minimal standards are quite low for areas with
significant economic value at risk. Here it is useful to think in terms of how
the residual, or remaining, flood risk37 varies with different levels of flood
protection. In an area with $1 billion of potential economic flood damages
(roughly the potential damage for a community of 5,000 homes having
potential losses of $200,000 per home), a 1-in-100 year level of protection
has a residual risk of $10 million per year ($2,000 per year per household).
Even a 1-in-500 year level of protection retains a flood risk of $2 million per
year ($400 per year per household).
36. This risk is defined as the product of the annual probability of each flood
size (the flood frequency) and the economic costs of that flood.
37. Residual risk is the risk from flows exceeding the flood design capacity or
the failure of flood management infrastructure before the design capacity is reached
(Green, 2004).
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The focus on achieving a weak frequency standard misleads
policymakers and the public into thinking that floods are adequately
managed (lames and Singer, 2008). This misperception often leads to
additional economic development on floodplains, further increasing already
high residual flood risks. If raising flood protection for agricultural land
(with a damage potential of $2,000 per acre) from 1-in-50 years to 1-in-200
years results in urbanization of that land (raising the damage potential to $1
million per acre), annual flood risk rises from $40 to $5,000 per acre.38 This
process has occurred time and again in the fast-growing Central Valley.
FIGURE 6:
Flood depths in the Sacramento region
Source: Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (www.safca.org)
38. $40 per acre-year = 0.02 per year*S2000 per acre;
$5,000 per acre-year = 0.005 per year * $1,000,000 per acre
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Financial incentives for flood infrastructure compound this problem,
because state and federal governments have paid for most flood
infrastructure, making it relatively affordable for communities to attain
minimal federal standards. In addition, local governments in the Central
Valley face skewed incentives since a 2003 California appellate court
decision, which holds the state liable for damages from failures of state
levees, even though local governments are responsible for land use
decisions and most levee maintenance (Department of Water Resources,
2005b). This encourages local agencies to promote development in flood-
prone areas, with the state bearing most flood liability.
Flood-prone development also is encouraged by human tendencies to
discount risk. Personal experience is the most important factor shaping
both perception of and response to flood risk, but length of time since
previous flooding also plays a critical role. This "flood memory half-life"
problem is well illustrated by the number of California residents that
purchased flood insurance following the Central Valley floods of 1997
(Hanak, 2008). Immediately afterward, per capita flood insurance. purchases
doubled (to four percent of properties), but largely returned to pre-flood
levels by 2005, despite no notable reductions in flood risk. Similarly,
politicians -are most likely to push for better flood protection soon after
flood events. More proactive risk communication, including public
disclosure of risks in areas protected by levees, would encourage insurance
purchases.39
Since federal standards and procedures are unlikely to change, the
onus is on the state to develop a better flood policy framework. A set of
bills signed into law in 2007 takes some steps in this direction, by tightening
the flood frequency standard to a 200-year flood for future urban
development in the Central Valley, making local governments share liability
with the state, and requiring communities to incorporate flood hazard
reduction in their general plans. But state policy still relies on a uniform
flood frequency standard. Moreover, the new flood policy only applies to
the Central Valley and not the densely populated regions of southern
California and the Bay Area that remain at high risk of flooding. A more risk-
based statewide flood management system; such as that used by the
Netherlands, where risk-based analysis was used to establish a l-in-10,000
year event protection level for urban areas (Woodall and Lund, 2009), would
require new legislation as well as better technical data and changes in
management approaches.
39. Hanak and Reed (forthcoming) find that the introduction of disclosure
rules for SFHA status upon home sale increases insurance uptake by about 15
percentage points.
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Replacing the Myth
No level of levee or reservoir investment can eliminate risk from
floods.
Any levee can fail, no matter the design level of protection, and any
historical floodplain can flood under the wrong circumstances, even when
combined with upstream reservoirs and flood by-passes. California should
move toward a policy focusing on risk-based management and improve the
communication of risk to floodplain residents.
VI. Governance and Legal Myths
Myth: California's Water Rights Laws Impede Reform and
Sustainable Management
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1897)
The Myth
This myth promotes the idea that California cannot effectively address
its current and future water challenges because of its system of archaic and
entrenched water rights. In this view, century-old water allocations and
rules still dominate California water law. So, for example, inefficient water
uses are insulated from regulation except in the most egregious cases of
waste. Likewise, seriously degraded aquatic ecosystems cannot receive
sufficient water because of longstanding water and contract rights. Belief in
the rigidity of California water law has been a major impediment to
improving water policy and management.
How the Myth Drives Debate
Many impartial observers of California's water rights system believe in
this myth, but it is also perpetuated by those who stand to lose from
changes in their water rights. Thus, many groundwater users argue that the
state has no authority to regulate their actions, and senior surface water
rights holders furnish legal objections to being held accountable for
environmental water flows. Water rights holders and water contractors often
contend that the government must pay them just compensation for
restrictions on their water use required to protect endangered species or
water quality. The difficulties of major legislative or constitutional reforms
of water rights and the potential costs of compensation can appear as
insurmountable obstacles to reform.
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The Reality
California's system of water rights is a complex, often confusing, and
sometimes incoherent amalgam." Challenges to water use efficiency and to
existing allocations of water can be problematic, both because of costs and
delays. of adjudication and because water and contract rights to water
service are "property" under the California and federal constitutions and
cannot be "taken" unless the government pays just compensation to the
41owners.
However, California water law embodies far more flexibility and
potential for reform than is often understood. Far from being an absolute
form of private property, water rights are shaped and constrained by a
variety of rules designed to ensure that all water uses are reasonable and
promote the public interest.
The "reasonable use". requirement of California's Constitution is the
foundation of the state's water rights system and applies to all water rights.4'
The California Supreme Court has held that "no one can acquire a vested
right to the unreasonable use of water" (Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 2000;
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). Consequently, the state may
enforce the reasonable use mandate without running afoul of the
constitutional ban on "taking" property.43 Water users, as well as individual
members of the public, have the authority to challenge an existing water use
as unreasonable.
Reasonable use is a dynamic principle that responds to changes in
hydrology, technology, scientific information, water demand, and economic
and social conditions (Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility
District, 1980). The determination of reasonable use "depends on the entire
circumstances of each case" and cannot be resolved in isolation from critical
statewide considerations. As water becomes increasingly scarce, a
paramount consideration is the "ever increasing need for the conservation of
, 40. These rights include riparian rights, pre-1914 appropriative rights,
permitted and licensed water rights, prescriptive rights, pueblo rights, overlying and
appropriative groundwater rights, and contract rights (Littleworth and Garner, 2007).
41. "Indeed, some courts that have adjudicated recent water rights takings
claims have been confused by the complexities of the state's water rights system or
deterred from addressing the most fundamental issue in such cases: whether the
claimants have protectable rights under California law to divert or use water in
situations where the exercise of the water right is harmful to water quality, fish, or
other instream beneficial uses (Casitas Municipal Water Dist. v. United States, 2008;
Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 2009).
42. The requirement appears in article X, section 2 of the Constitution and
extends to groundwater and pre-1914 surface water rights that otherwise fall outside
the State Water Resources Control Board's permit and license jurisdiction (Barstow v.
Mojave Water Agency, 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983).
43. loslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 1967.
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water" (Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 2000).
The public trust doctrine further contributes to the flexibility of
California's water rights system. The state has both the authority and the
"affirmative duty ... to protect public trust uses whenever feasible" (National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). This means that the state "has the
power to reconsider allocation decisions" even after it has awarded a water
right. Like the reasonable use requirement, the public trust doctrine is
dynamic and "sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs"
(Marks v. Whitney, 1971).
The flexibility inherent in these fundamental rules of California water
rights law has enabled the state to address inefficient or outdated water
uses in a variety of settin.gs." The doctrine of reasonable use may support
several necessary changes in California water policy, including:
1) Prevention of waste and improvement in water use efficiency
A property right in water wholly depends on its reasonable use. The
state has authority to declare a variety of water practices unreasonable, even
if they were considered acceptable in the past. These may include excessive
evaporative and conveyance losses, inefficient irrigation techniques, failure
to adopt or to implement best management practices, and perhaps other
profligate uses such as the irrigation of water-intensive crops and
landscaping, failure to install low-flow water appliances, and continued
reliance on imported water instead of using cost-effective alternatives such
as demand reduction, use of recharged groundwater, and recycling of
reclaimed wastewater. This would not constitute a "taking" for which the
state would need to pay just compensation.
2) Creation of incentives to enhance water allocation efficiency
The state may wield the unreasonable use determination as an
incentive for more efficient water use and allocation. One of the premises of
the modern water transfer statutes is the creation of economic incentives for
the reallocation of conserved water and water for which the transferor can
earn more revenue in transfer than in its own use. Enforcement of the
44 To date, the State Water Resources Control Board and the courts have
applied article X, section 2 to declare unreasonable excessive use of water by
riparians in light of new, competing appropriations for municipal water supply;
wasteful conveyance losses to supply senior appropriative rights; simultaneous,
aggregate diversions by riparians and appropriators that created critical shortages of
water needed to protect wine grapes; maintenance of unexercised riparian rights at
full priority in an over-appropriated watershed; inefficient conveyance and
production of excessive tailwater by pre-1914 appropriators that caused flooding of
adjacent lands; an upstream point of diversion that threatened recreational and
other instream uses downriver; the storage and diversion of water that jeopardizes
compliance with water quality standards, the public trust, and other in situ beneficial
uses; and excessive use of groundwater by overlying landowners in an overdrafted
basin (Gray, 1994b & 2002).
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reasonable use mandate to induce these types of transfers is consistent with
these statutes and should become a more prominent component of
California's water use efficiency and reallocation strategy.
3) Compliance with environmental standards and protection of the
public trust
The reasonable use doctrine also helps to implement and enforce the
public trust and the other environmental laws that protect water quality,
endangered species, aquatic habitat, and other in situ uses. These laws
establish fundamental limitations on the amount of water that water right
holders and their derivative users may impound and divert from California's
rivers, lakes, and estuaries. They also restrict the quantity and types of
return flow and effluent that water users may discharge back into the state's
water systems. Because there is no valid property right in an unreasonable
use, when the state acts to abate water practices that unreasonably harm
the environment it may do so without payment of just compensation.
Replacing the Myth
The legal tools for reform are already present in California's water
rights laws. Indeed, they have been there for many decades. We just have to
use them.
The state legislature, as well as state agencies, courts, and private
water users, have significant authority under current water law to meet the
myriad challenges facing California.
However, strong leadership will be required to overcome resistance to
change. The SWRCB needs political support and an adequate budget to
supervise and to promote the reasonable use of water. And California needs
to begin requiring the full range of water rights holders to disclose their
water use. Accurate and current information about surface and groundwater
use is essential to the task of better managing the state's water resources.
Myth: Groundwater is Separate from Surface Water
California is the only western state that still treats surface water and
groundwater under separate and distinct legal regimes .... As the
present case illustrates, classification disputes in this field quickly take
on an Alice-in-Wonderland quality because the legal categories (e.g.,
"subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels,"
"percolating water") are drawn from antiquated case law and bear little
or no relationship to hydrological realities.
North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Resources Control Board
39 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1590 (2006)
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The Myth
Water pumped from the ground is a major component of California's
water supplies, accounting for roughly one-third of all agricultural and urban
water use in years with normal rainfall, and considerably more in dry years.4"
It is widely understood that ground and surface waters form a hydrologically
connected system in much of the state.46  Yet the conventional
understanding in California water policy is that groundwater and surface
water are legally distinct, with groundwater rights and regulation
fundamentally separated from surface water rights and regulation. Like the
myth of inflexible water rights, this understanding contains elements of
truth, but also misses important aspects of current California law that would
allow for more effective, integrated management of water resources.
How the Myth Drives Debate
The myth that these two types of water are legally distinct has
exacerbated two central problems of contemporary California water
resources management. It has prevented water managers and regulators
from accounting for the effects of groundwater withdrawals on surface water
supplies (and vice versa). It also has allowed policymakers to tolerate serious
cases of groundwater overdraft and indirect withdrawal of surface waters
because of the perceived difficulties of applying to aquifers rules commonly
accepted as essential components of surface water regulation.
The Reality
The state's modern water code, enacted in 1913, does indeed create an
artificial separation between groundwater and surface water rights. The
45. The balance consists of surface water flowing in rivers and streams (and
often stored behind dams). Recycled wastewater accounts for less than one percent
of the total used by farms and urban areas.
46. Hydrologists, water managers, and most water users have known for
decades that surface streams and underlying aquifers are physically integrated
systems inmost of California (Bredehoft, Papadopulos, and Cooper, 1982; Harter,
.2003). Before extensive water resources development occurred in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, groundwater in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys was
in a rough balance with surface streams. High winter and spring surface flows,
especially at higher elevations, would push some stream flow into aquifers. In
summer and early fall, these higher aquifer levels would increase base flows to
surface streams (Harou and Lund, 2008). As development and use of these water
resources increased, surface water recharge of the aquifers diminished; and as
groundwater levels fell, the aquifers reduced flows to surface streams. Although
increased pumping during much of the twentith century has reduced the flows
between groundwater and surface water resources (Fleckenstein, et al., 2004), .
infiltration from surface streams remains important for groundwater recharge
(Harter, 2003). Deep percolation of irrigation return flows - the amount of water in
excess of plant needs - also contributes to recharge.
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Water Commission Act of 1913 created a permit and license system only for
surface water and "subterranean streams flowing through known and
definite channels. '' 47 The statute has been consistently interpreted as not
applying to "percolating" groundwater - regardless of the hydrologic
relationship between such groundwater and surface water resources. Most
other states have legal and regulatory systems that provide much more
integrated management of surface and underground waters.48
Nevertheless, integrated management of hydrologically connected
groundwater and surface water is in fact a prominent feature of
contemporary California water policy, recognized by all three branches of
state government:
* The foundational directive of state groundwater rights law - that
aggregate withdrawals not exceed the safe yield of the aquifer - recognizes
that groundwater basins are recharged principally by surface water sources,
including percolation from precipitation, surface streams, residual water
from urban and agricultural uses, and managed recharge (e.g., Los Angeles v.
San Fernando, 1975).
* The Legislature has created several special water management
districts (in Orange, Santa Clara, and Ventura Counties) with authority to
regulate groundwater extractions and impose pumping charges to reduce
economic incentives to overdraft and to pay the costs of imported surface
water supplies (Schneider, 1977).
47. Although early California law and policy are often credited with ignoring
the hydrologic interrelationships between groundwater and surface water, the record
is more ambiguous. The California Supreme Court's first important twentith century
groundwater rights decision, Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) is famous for its adoption of
the basic rules of groundwater rights that remain the law of the state to this day:
overlying landowners have first call on the waters of aquifers beneath their lands,
followed by non-overlying users in order of their priority of appropriation. Less
remembered is the Court's recognition that groundwater and surface water resources
most often occur as single, integrated systems. Although the Court acknowledged
that it "is usual to speak of the extraction of this water from the ground as a
development of a hitherto unused supply," in fact groundwater pumping may cause
"an exhaustion of the underground sources from which the surface streams and other
supplies previously used have been fed and supported." In a review of the legislative
record for the Water Commission Act of 1913, Sax (2003) concluded that the
Legislature intended to grant the Water Commission (predecessor to the State Water
Resources Control Board) regulatory jurisdiction over the "pumping of groundwater
that appreciably and directly affected surface stream flows."
48. Under Colorado law, for example, all groundwater is presumed to be
"tributary" - i.e., hydrologically connected to surface water - unless the groundwater
user can prove that its pumping will have only negligible effects on surface water
sources. Arizona strictly limits the withdrawal of groundwater in areas of critical
overdraft. other states, including Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon and Utah,
have permit systems governing the appropriation of groundwater and surface water
(Sax, et al., 2006).
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* Most judicial decrees in the nineteen adjudicated groundwater
basins authorize similar types of conjunctive, water management
arrangements (Blomquist, 1992).
a The California Supreme Court recognized in the Los Angeles
groundwater adjudication that the city's pueblo water rights in the Los
Angeles River extend to all hydrologically connected groundwater (Los
Angeles v. San Fernando, 1975).
* The legislature authorized the SWRCB and the courts to
adjudicate all groundwater and surface waters of the Scott River System as a
single hydrologic resource, and the decree in that case manages
groundwater and surface water uses as an integrated system (Schneider,
1977; Department of Water Resources, 2003).
* The California Supreme Court adjudicated all groundwater and
surface water rights in the Mojave River basin adjudication and affirmed a
decree based on the importation of surface water to recharge the aquifer to
support groundwater uses (Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 2000).
* In an unusual move, the SWRCB recently began limiting total
withdrawals (including groundwater) to help maintain flows in the Russian
River (State Water Resources Control Board, 2009a).
In addition, numerous less formal methods are employed for
managing surface and groundwater resources jointly. Many water districts
in. the Central Valley seek to reduce groundwater overdraft by setting the
price of surface water supplies to be slightly below the costs of pumping
groundwater. This encourages farmers to use surface waters in wetter years,
both to reduce groundwater withdrawals and to promote aquifer recharge
(Vaux, 1986; Jenkins, 1991; Bredehoft, et al., 1995). In Kern County and other
areas, regional water managers have established sophisticated groundwater
banking projects, which store native and imported surface water for local
and export uses (Thomas, 2001; Hanak, 2003).
But problems remain. Groundwater banking is hindered in basins
where parties cannot agree on accounting and management protocols - a
problem in much of the Central Valley. Under current state law, it is
possible to transfer surface water and make up the difference by pumping
groundwater, even if the additional pumping reduces stream flows - a
concern in much of the Sacramento Valley (Gray, 1994b). A similar issue can
arise with the regulation of environmental flows. When the SWRCB
instructed surface water users along the Russian River to reduce diversions
to protect endangered steelhead in 2008, increased groundwater pumping
limited the effectiveness of the regulation, prompting the Board to set
overall conservation targets, as noted above. More integrated legal
treatment of groundwater and surface water is key to resolving these types of
problems.
Reform by legislation, rather than through ad hoc judic ial or
administrative determinations, is desirable because integrated
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administration of groundwater and surface water rights in each hydrologic
basin will require comprehensive analyses of the volume and movement of
water within the aquifers, the effects of groundwater pumping on surface
water supplies, the sources and rates of surface water recharge, the effects of
surface water diversions on groundwater recharge, the relative contributions
of native and imported surface water sources, the appropriate ordering of
priorities among groundwater rights and surface water rights in the newly
integrated systems, and other factors. But as noted in the preceding myth,
even without new legislation, the SWRCB and the courts have authority
under the reasonable use and public trust doctrines to limit groundwater
withdrawals that unreasonably affect surface water resources or impair the
public trust in surface streams and lakes.
Replacing the Myth
Despite the long-standing legal distinction between ground water and
surface water rights, California's groundwater and surface water resources
are often closely interconnected and managed conjunctively.
With population growth and increasing demands for environmental
flows, California is likely to experience increasing conflicts in areas where
groundwater and surface water are governed separately and continuing
overdraft of aquifers as demands for water rise and usable surface supplies
diminish. Although all branches of government have taken actions to
integrate these water resources in various parts of. the state, legislative
reform is desirable to better integrate the administration of groundwater
and surface water statewide.
Myth: We Can Find a Consensus that Will Keep All Parties
Happy




This myth is a modern-day reaction to the idea that California's water
problems will always result in "water wars" - hard-fought battles between
opposing parties that result in winners and losers, most often decided by
the courts or public referenda. Achieving consensus is seen as an
alternative way to balance the many ccimpeting interests, views, and goals of
different stakeholders. But when consensus processes avoid inevitable
tradeoffs in water management, they can lead to ineffective incrementalism
and indecision on critical water policy issues.
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How the Myth Drives Debate
Consensus-based decision-making was popularized during the
CALFED 49 decade, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, when diverse
parties sought mutually compatible solutions for the environmental, water
supply, and land use problems of the Delta under the slogan "we will all get
better together." Although that process is widely considered to have failed
in achieving its primary goals, consensus-based decision-making continues
as the hallmark of stakeholder-driven planning and policy processes. Many
stakeholders support the idea of consensus processes to be sure they get a
seat at the bargaining table so they can defend their interests and stall or
veto unfavorable decisions.
The Reality
Consensus is most promising where incremental changes to the status
quo can allow all parties to improve their position without sacrificing
fundamental interests or positions. For instance, the state's new recycled
water policy was developed through a collaboration of regulators, water
users, and environmentalists (State Water Resources Control Board, 2009c).
Similarly, the California Urban Water Conservation Council (a group of water
utilities, agencies, and environmental organizations) has had good success
in fostering urban water conservation actions across the state.
However, many major water policy choices facing California will not
result in win-win outcomes, and will require some groups to relinquish
fundamental positions or interests. A peripheral canal can benefit the
economy and the environment, but will likely accelerate water quality losses
for some Delta farmers, and it makes it less likely that the state will provide
large subsidies to shore up all of the Delta's aging levees (Lund, et al., 2008).
Taxpayer-financed surface storage will benefit some water users and perhaps
also some fish, but it will mean higher taxes or lower public spending on
other programs (such as education). Some environmental actions may
largely benefit future residents, at some cost to current residents. Seeking
consensus on all water policy matters runs the risk of maintaining the status
quo, rather than making hard choices.
Most large stakeholder-driven processes seek small incremental
changes in the status quo, because large changes threaten too many
interests (Lindblom, 1959, 1979). This risk avoidance is especially
problematic when decisions must be made with some urgency and
49. CALFED was a program to address the various problems facing the Delta,
bringing together the various state and federal agencies overseeing water supply,
water quality, and species management. Although stakeholders from various
interest groups were not formally represented in the CALFED governing structure,
their participation was an essential part of negotiations leading up to the
development of a Record of Decision (and an investment plan) in 2000.
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incremental options are decidedly inferior (Coglianese, 1999; Lomas, 1991).
Such was the experience with CALFED for the Delta, and it is a comrhonly
cited problem with decentralized decisionmaking (Little Hoover
Commission, 2005; Goodhue, Simon and Stratton, 2009; Hanemann and
Dyckman, 2009). Within a system of decentralized interests and governance,
leadership from state and/or federal authorities is often needed to chart
strategic new directions.
Placing a consensus process within a legal, regulatory, or political
framework and timeline can motivate parties to be more earnest and timely
in seeking consensus solutions. For instance, the accord on restoring flows
to the San Joaquin River was reached by farmers and environmentalists
under the threat of a court-ordered solution. If consensus processes fall
short, some tough decisions need to be brokered by higher level authorities,
with an aim to achieve significant buy-in, rather than to make all parties
happy.
Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not mean ignoring the
consequences for affected parties. When the best overall solutions involve
losses to fragile groups, side payments - in cash or in kind - can help soften
the costs of adjustment. Incentive payments are likely the best option for
Delta landowners facing eventual loss of some islands to flooding (Lund, et
al., 2007, 2008). Financial payments have softened effects of structural
changes in the economy with severe ramifications for some industries (e.g.,
textiles, logging), and similar strategies have been used to address the
financial impacts of water transfers in some California farm communities
(Hanak, 2003).
Replacing the Myth
Consensus is not always feasible for achieving sustainable water policy
outcomes. For some big decisions, tradeoffs are inevitable and higher level
authorities need to provide direction and motivation, and to mediate
conflict.
Although decentralized decisionmaking can be highly effective for
many local and incremental water management decisions, matters of
broader public importance, involving many historically confrontational
interests, will require strong state and/or federal leadership to broker
solutions and achieve significant buy-in. Finding ways to acknowledge and
address consequences to affected parties - without ceding to unreasonable
calls for compensation - is a central challenge for California's water future.
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VII.Moving Beyond Myth
People would rather live with a problem that they cannot solve than
accept a solution that they cannot understand.
-Woolsey and Swanson, 1975
California faces major challenges in establishing a sustainable path for
water resource management in the twenty-first century, as continued
population' growth, unmet environmental demands, and climate change will
pose increasing strains on the state's usable water resources, raise costs and
heighten already substantial conflicts among various interest groups.
Fortunately, California's innovative water resource sector will help meet
those challenges. Numerous local and regional water supply, quality, and
flood control agencies actively experiment with solutions and learn from
each other to adapt to changing conditions and opportunities.
Yet a significant downside of this decentralized system is the limited
extent to which information is collected, shared, and analyzed on matters of
statewide importance. This setting fosters the persistence of water myths -a
collection of partial- truths, oversimplifications, outdated notions, and
misperceptions - which distort policy debates and impede the development
of effective policies. Myths are often more convenient than reality, which
forces society to confront hard choices.
Available, up-to-date information - such as that presented here -
provides a basis for rebuilding public policy discussions on myth-free
foundations. Some foundational facts include the following: First,
California has passed the point where reasonably priced "new" water is
available, and costly new infrastructure decisions must be weighed against
alternatives that use existing infrastructure more effectively, taking into
account cost, reliability, and environmental consequences. Second, there
are no villains: water users in both the urban and agricultural sectors have
been making strides to improve water use efficiency for some time, and
environmental water uses provide economic and social benefits. Third,
improving the conditions of our degraded aquatic ecosystems will require
adaptive management approaches that have not yet been widely employed
in California and that may reduce the reliability of supplies. Fourth, while
some management solutions will provide benefits to multiple parties, many
solutions will involve contentious tradeoffs.
To advance the policy process, California must improve the collection,
analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of information to policymakers and
the public. To help dispel the myths examined here and support a
pragmatic assessment of solutions, we suggest some specific actions:
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1) Improve flows of existing information
Establishing a common understanding among the public and elected
officials requires organizing and disseminating available information, such
as broad trends in water use by sector and region and the costs of water
supply alternatives (Water Supply myths).
2) Collect and disseminate new information
To provide a sounder basis for using California's water laws for
groundwater and ensuring reasonable use, California must collect and
document more accurate water use information from the field (Water Rights
myths). This will require changes in the law, to require reporting by all surface
and groundwater users, regardless of the nature of their water rights - an
unpopular move for many water users.
3) Expand analyses
Moving forward often will require significant new analysis to develop
actionable information and understanding. Expanded data collection and
analysis will be particularly important for improving ecosystem management
(Ecosystem myths), flood management (Flood myth), integrated water
management portfolios (Water Supply myths), and other purposes.
Expanded analysis also should include lessons from other states and
countries which struggle with similar problems. More generally, a better
understanding of the value of ecosystem services and the tradeoffs inherent
in water policy decisions (Consensus myth) can help ,clarify the policy
choices California faces.
Information alone will not dispel California's water myths. In a world
of scarcity and tradeoffs, myths provide convenient rhetoric for specific
stakeholder interests. However, better technical and scientific information,
analysis, and synthesis will be an essential support to better policy. If the
state's leaders are serious about finding solutions to California's water
challenges, they must not shy away from requiring better reporting and
analysis, even if stakeholders resist.
Moving beyond myth will not end debate; many difficult problems and
areas of legitimate disagreement will remain. But when built on solid
factual foundations, policy discussions can focus on a more realistic
consideration of critical, long-term water management issues. The
challenges are many, and California's future depends on facing them.
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